18 ideas
| 10017 | Truth in a model is more tractable than the general notion of truth [Hodes] |
| 10018 | Truth is quite different in interpreted set theory and in the skeleton of its language [Hodes] |
| 10015 | Higher-order logic may be unintelligible, but it isn't set theory [Hodes] |
| 10011 | Identity is a level one relation with a second-order definition [Hodes] |
| 10016 | When an 'interpretation' creates a model based on truth, this doesn't include Fregean 'sense' [Hodes] |
| 10027 | Mathematics is higher-order modal logic [Hodes] |
| 10026 | Arithmetic must allow for the possibility of only a finite total of objects [Hodes] |
| 10021 | It is claimed that numbers are objects which essentially represent cardinality quantifiers [Hodes] |
| 10022 | Numerical terms can't really stand for quantifiers, because that would make them first-level [Hodes] |
| 10023 | Talk of mirror images is 'encoded fictions' about real facts [Hodes] |
| 2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
| 2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
| 2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
| 2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
| 2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
| 2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
| 16006 | Either Abraham rises higher than universal ethics, or he is a mere murderer [Kierkegaard] |
| 7577 | Abraham was willing to suspend ethics, for a higher idea [Kierkegaard] |